LUBA Headnotes Database
Oregon Land Use Board of Appeals case law, organized by topic and searchable.
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1. - Administrative Law
1.1 - Interpretation of Law
1.1.1 - Generally
1.1.2 - Rules of Construction
1.1.3 - Effect of Local Government Interpretation
1.1.4 - Procedural Requirements
1.2 - Denials
1.2.1 - Generally
1.2.2 - Requirements for
1.2.3 - Burden to Challenge
1.2.4 - Evidence to Support
1.3 - Findings Generally
1.3.1 - What Constitutes
1.3.2 - Necessary Elements
1.3.3 - Form of
1.4 - Adequacy of Findings
1.4.1 - Generally
1.4.2 - Applicable Standards
1.4.3 - Facts Relied on
1.4.4 - Explanation of Rationale
1.4.5 - Related Findings
1.4.6 - Issues Addressed
1.4.7 - Scope
1.4.8 - Logic and Consistency
1.5 - Requirements for Findings
1.5.1 - Generally
1.5.2 - Statutes
1.5.3 - Statewide Goals
1.5.4 - Administrative Rules
1.5.5 - Local Standards
1.6 - Substantial Evidence
1.6.1 - Generally
1.6.2 - Definition of
1.6.3 - Official Notice
1.6.4 - Expert Testimony
1.6.5 - Conflicting Evidence
1.7 - Evidence Which Clearly Supports
1.8 - Burden of Proof
1.6 - Substantial Evidence
2. - Constitutional Law
2.1 - Oregon Constitution
2.1.1 - Procedural Issues
2.1.2 - Nonprocedural Issues
2.2 - U.S. Constitution
2.2.1 - Procedural Issues
2.2.2 - Nonprocedural Issues
2.3 - Nonspecific Constitutional Claims
3. - EFU Statute/Ordinances
3.1 - Generally
3.2 - Farm Uses
3.2.1 - Generally
3.2.2 - Farm Dwellings
3.2.3 - Other Uses
3.3 - Nonfarm Uses
3.3.1 - Generally
3.3.2 - Mineral Operation
3.3.3 - Dwellings
3.3.4 - Compatibility Standard
3.3.5 - Noninterference Standard
3.3.6 - Stability Standard
3.3.7 - Unsuitability Standard
3.3.8 - No Significant Change/Increase Std
3.3.9 - Other Uses
3.4 - Land Divisions
3.4.1 - Generally
3.4.2 - Minimum Lot Sizes
3.5 - Statutory Policy
3.6 - Lot of Record Dwellings
4. - Statewide Planning Goals/LCDC Rules
4.1 - Applicability
4.2 - Compliance with
4.3 - Definitions
4.4 - Acknowledgment
5. - Citizen Involvement
6. - Land Use Planning
6.1 - Generally
6.2 - Coordination
6.3 - Exceptions/ Exception Rule
6.3.1 - Generally
6.3.2 - Developed
6.3.3 - Committed
6.3.4 - Reasons
6.3.5 - When Required
6.3.6 - Changes to
6.4 - Alternative Courses of Action
6.5 - Adequate Factual Base
7. - Agricultural Lands/Goal 3 Rule
7.1 - Generally
7.2 - Agricultural Land Definition
7.2.1 - Generally
7.2.2 - Soil Classes
7.2.3 - Other Suitable Land
7.2.4 - Other Necessary Land
7.3 - Minimum Lot Size Standard
7.3.1 - Commercial Agricultural Enterprise
7.3.2 - Operation and Effect of
7.4 - Land Divisions
7.5 - Multiple Resource Lands
7.6 - Exceptions to
7.7 - Farm Uses
7.7.1 - Generally
7.7.2 - Farm Dwellings
7.8 - Nonfarm Uses
8. - Forest Lands/Goal 4 Rule
8.1 - Generally
8.2 - Forest Land Definition
8.3 - Forest Uses
8.4 - Nonforest Uses
8.5 - Land Divisions
8.5.1 - Generally
8.5.2 - Minimum Lot Sizes
8.6 - Multiple Resource Lands
8.7 - Exceptions to
8.8 - Forest Dwellings
8.9 - Lots of Record
8.10 - Forest Practices Act
9. - Open Spaces and Natural Resources/Goal 5 Rule
9.1 - Generally
9.2 - Resource Inventory
9.3 - Conflicting Use Identification
9.4 - ESEE Consequence Determination
9.5 - Resource Protection Programs
10. - Air, Water and Land Resource Quality
11. - Natural Disasters and Hazards
12. - Recreational Needs
13. - Economy of the State/Goal 9 Rule
14. - Housing/Goal 10 Rule
15. - Pupblic Facilities and Services/Goal 11 Rule
16. - Transportation/Goal 12 Rule
17. - Energy Conservation
18. - Urbanization/Goal 14 Rule
18.1 - Generally
18.2 - Establishment of UGB
18.3 - Amendment of UGB
18.4 - Conversion Factors
18.5 - Urban Uses on Rural Land
18.6 - Annexations/Incorporation
18.6.1 - Goal Standards
18.6.2 - LCDC Rule
18.7 - Exceptions to
18.8 - Urban Reserves
19. - Willamette River Greenway
20. - Estuarine Resources
21. - Coastal Shorelines
22. - Beaches and Dunes
23. - Ocean Resources
24. - Standing
24.1 - Before Local Government
24.2 - Before LUBA
24.2.1 - Generally
24.2.2 - Requirement to Establish
24.2.3 - Appearance
24.2.4 - Right to Notice
24.2.5 - Adverse Effect
24.2.6 - Aggrievement
24.2.7 - Quasi-judicial Decision
24.2.8 - Legislative Decision
24.2.9 - Limitations on
24.2.10 - State Agencies
24.3 - Representational
25. - Local Government Procedures
25.1 - Generally
25.2 - Authority to Act
25.3 - Compliance with Statutes
25.3.1 - Generally
25.3.2 - Applicable Criteria
25.3.3 - Notice of Hearing
25.3.4 - Hearings
25.3.5 - Time Limit for Final Action
25.3.6 - Findings
25.3.7 - Notice of Decision
25.3.8 - Appeals
25.3.9 - Raise It/Waive It (ORS 197.763)
25.3.10 - Limited Land Use Decisions
25.4 - Compliance with Local Ordinances/Regs
25.4.1 - Generally
25.4.2 - Application Requirements
25.4.3 - Notice Requirements
25.4.4 - Requirements for Standards/Criteria
25.4.5 - Deviations From
25.4.6 - Changes in Law
25.4.7 - Appeal Rights
25.5 - Delegation of Authority
25.6 - Hearings
25.6.1 - Generally
25.6.2 - Limitations on Presentation
25.6.3 - Evidence
25.6.4 - Site Visits
25.6.5 - Impartial Tribunal
25.6.6 - When Required
25.7 - Legislative/Quasi-judicial Distinction
25.8 - Discretionary/Ministerial Distinction
25.9 - Formalities of Decisions
25.10 - Necessity for Objections to
25.11 - Action After Remand
25.12 - Other
26. - LUBA Jurisdiction
26.1 - Generally
26.2 - Land Use Decision: Statutory Test
26.2.1 - Generally
26.2.2 - Final Decision
26.2.3 - Local Government/Special District Decision
26.2.4 - Goal, Plan or Land Use Regulation
26.2.5 - State Agency Decision
26.2.6 - Ministerial Exception
26.2.7 - Urban Division Exception
26.2.8 - Limited Land Use Decision
26.2.9 - Transportation Facility Exception
26.2.10 - Compatibility Statement Exception
26.2.11 - Zoning Classification Decisions
26.3 - Land Use Decision: Significant Impacts Test
26.4 - Land Use Decision: Exclusions
26.5 - Exhaustion of Remedies
26.6 - Mootness
26.7 - Effect of LCDC Proceedings
26.8 - Effect of Circuit Court Proceedings
26.9 - Statute of Ultimate Repose
26.10 - Effect of Ballot Measure 37 (ORS 197.352)
26.11 - Effect of Ballot Measure 49
27. - LUBA Procedures/Rules
27.1 - Generally
27.2 - Perfecting an Appeal
27.2.1 - Generally
27.2.2 - Notice of Intent to Appeal
27.2.3 - Payment of Fee and Deposit for Costs
27.3 - Record
27.3.1 - Generally
27.3.2 - Content/Form
27.3.3 - Objections to
27.3.4 - Settling the Record
27.4 - Petition for Review
27.4.1 - Generally
27.4.2 - Cross-Petition
27.5 - Briefs
27.5.1 - Generally
27.5.2 - Respondent's
27.5.3 - State Agency
27.5.4 - Amicus
27.5.5 - Reply
27.6 - Evidentiary Hearings
27.6.1 - Generally
27.6.2 - Grounds for
27.6.3 - Motion for
27.6.4 - Procedures
27.6.5 - Depositions
27.7 - Parties
27.7.1 - Petitioner
27.7.2 - Respondent
27.7.3 - Intervenor/ Participant
27.7.4 - Amicus
27.7.5 - Representation
27.8 - Consolidation
27.9 - Stays
27.9.1 - Generally
27.9.2 - Colorable Claim of Error
27.9.3 - Irreparable Injury
27.9.4 - Procedures
27.9.5 - Order
27.10 - Time Limits
27.10.1 - Notice of Intent to Appeal
27.10.2 - Record Objections
27.10.3 - Petition for Review
27.10.4 - Final Opinion
27.10.5 - Other Documents
27.10.6 - Extensions
27.10.7 - Failure to Comply
27.11 - Service
27.11.1 - Notice of Intent to Appeal
27.11.2 - Intervention/ Participation
27.11.3 - Record and Objections
27.11.4 - Other Documents
27.11.5 - Failure to Comply
27.12 - Costs
27.12.1 - Prevailing Party
27.12.2 - Amount
27.12.3 - Petition for Review Not Filed
27.12.4 - Generally
27.13 - Attorney Fees
27.14 - Official Notice
27.15 - Transfers to Circuit Court
27.16 - Withdrawal of Decision
27.17 - Mediation
28. - LUBA Scope of Review
28.1 - Generally
28.2 - Denials
28.3 - Goal Exceptions
28.4 - Post-acknowledgment Amendments
28.5 - Legislative Decisions
28.6 - Waiver of Issues
28.6.1 - Failure to Raise in Prior LUBA Appeal
28.6.2 - Failure to Raise in Local Proceedings
28.6.3 - Issues Conclusively Resolved in Prior Appeal
28.6.4 - Failure to Raise in Local Appeal
28.7 - After Remand by Court
28.8 - Grounds for Reversal/Remand
28.8.1 - Generally
28.8.2 - Lack of Jurisdiction
28.8.3 - Unconstitutionality
28.8.4 - Procedural Errors
28.8.5 - Noncompliance with Applicable Law
28.8.6 - Inadequate Findings
28.8.7 - Unsupported by Substantial Evidence
28.8.8 - Harmless Error
28.8.9 - Other
28.9 - State Agency Decisions
28.10 - Limited Land Use Decisions
28.11 - Effect of Ballot Measure 37 Waiver (ORS 197.352)
28.12 - Effect of Ballot Measure 49 (ORS 195.300 to 195.336)
29. - Comprehensive Plans
29.1 - Adoption
29.1.1 - Generally
29.1.2 - Procedure
29.1.3 - Standards
29.2 - Amendment
29.2.1 - Generally
29.2.2 - Text Amendment: Procedure
29.2.3 - Text Amendment: Standards
29.2.4 - Map Amendment: Procedure
29.2.5 - Map Amendment: Standards
29.3 - Applicability
29.3.1 - Generally
29.3.2 - As Decision Criteria
29.3.3 - Effect of Acknowledgment
29.3.4 - Subarea Plans
29.4 - Interpretation
30. - Zoning Ordinances
30.1 - Adoption
30.1.1 - Generally
30.1.2 - Procedure
30.1.3 - Standards
30.2 - Amendment
30.2.1 - Generally
30.2.2 - Text Amendment: Procedure
30.2.3 - Text Amendment: Standards
30.2.4 - Map Amendment: Procedure
30.2.5 - Map Amendment: Standards
30.3 - Applicability
30.4 - Interpretation
31. - Permits
31.1 - Approval Standards
31.1.1 - Generally
31.1.2 - Application Requirements
31.1.3 - Standards/Criteria
31.1.4 - Use of Conditions
31.1.5 - Statutory Requirement for
31.2 - Types
31.2.1 - Building
31.2.2 - Conditional Use
31.2.3 - Design Review
31.2.4 - Other
31.3 - Particular Uses
31.3.1 - Airports
31.3.2 - Farm Dwellings
31.3.3 - Forest Dwellings
31.3.4 - Mineral and Aggregate
31.3.5 - Nonresource Dwellings
31.3.6 - Power Generators
31.3.7 - Shopping Centers
31.3.8 - Transmission Towers/Lines
31.3.9 - Waste Disposal Facilities
31.3.10 - Home Occupations
31.3.11 - Erosion Control Structures
31.3.12 - Destination Resorts
31.3.13 - Golf Courses
31.3.14 - Churches
31.3.15 - Schools
31.3.16 - Manufactured Homes
31.3.17 - Firearms Training Facilities
31.3.18 - Wineries
31.3.19 - Farm Stands
31.3.20 - Needed Housing
32. - Planned Unit Developments
32.1 - Procedures
32.2 - Standards
33. - Land Divisions
33.1 - Subdivisions
33.2 - Partitions
33.3 - Lot Line Adjustments
33.4 - Generally
34. - Variances
35. - Moratoria
36. - Nonconforming Uses
36.1 - Generally
36.2 - Definition
36.3 - Determination of Existence
36.4 - Abandonment/Interruption
36.5 - Alteration/Change
36.6 - Expansion
36.7 - Restoration/Replacement
36.8 - Regulation
37. - Vested Rights
38. - State Agencies
38.1 - Generally
38.2 - Permits
38.3 - Local Gov't Compatibility Determinations
39. - Boundary Changes
39.1 - Generally
39.2 - Incorporation/Formation
39.3 - Annexation
40. - Wetlands
41. - Urban Renewal Plans
42. - Wrecking Certificates
43. - Special Districts
44. - Marginal Lands
45. - Conditions of Approval
45.1 - Generally
45.2 - Authority to Impose
45.3 - Exactions
45.4 - Consents to Annexation
45.5 - Waivers of Remonstrance
46. - Outdoor Mass Gatherings
47. - Ballot Measure 37 (ORS 197.352)
47.1 - Generally
47.2 - Local Waivers
47.3 - State Waivers
48. - Ballot Measure 49
48.1 - Generally
49. - Marijuana Laws
Showing 100 results
M & T Partners, Inc. v. City of Salem, 80 Or LUBA 221 (2019)
Summary:
To the extent that LUBA’s holding in Perry v. Yamhill County, 26 Or LUBA 73, 80, aff’d, 125 Or App 588, 865 P2d 1344 (1993), that the reasoning in Clark v. Jackson County, 313 Or 508, 836 P2d 710 (1992), extends to a local govrnment’s interpretation of a prior land use decision, was correct, it was superseded by ORS 197.829(1), which requires LUBA to affirm “a local government’s interpretation of its comprehensive plan and land use regulations” but does not require LUBA to affirm a local government’s interpretation of a prior land use decision, findings adopted in support thereof, or conditions of approval attached thereto, which LUBA reviews under ORS 197.835(9)(a)(D) to determine whether the local government “[i]mproperly construed the applicable law.”
VanSickle v. Klamath County, 80 Or LUBA 241 (2019)
Summary:
Where a significant resource overlay zone provision requires that (1) resource sites not be altered or impacted to a degree that destroys their significance, (2) the proposed development not result in the loss of habitat for threatened or endangered species, (3) all feasible alternatives to the development that would not result in a substantial adverse impact on identified resource values be considered and rejected, (4) the development be sited on the property in such a manner that minimizes adverse impacts on identified resources, and (5) documentation be provided regarding requirements for state or federal permits or licenses and that appropriate resource management agencies have reviewed the development proposal against their plans, policies, and programs, the local government does not err in concluding that that provision applies at the development stage rather than the PAPA stage.
York v. Clackamas County, 79 Or LUBA 278 (2019)
Summary:
Where a local code provision requires a finding that a proposed use “will not significantly increase fire hazard or significantly increase fire suppression costs or significantly increase risks to fire suppression personnel,” the proper comparison is between the proposed use and the pre-existing use, not between the proposed use and typical uses of the same type.
Mintz v. City of Beaverton, 66 Or LUBA 118 (2012)
Summary:
A one-half-acre size requirement threshold for requiring PUD approval is not a mere application requirement that can be overlooked to require PUD approval for proposals of less than one-half acre. Even if the city intended to delete that threshold for PUD proposals near transit stations, where the threshold clearly applies it cannot be overlooked to give effect to an intent that is inconsistent with the text of the zoning ordinance.
Wynn v. Polk County, 47 Or LUBA 73 (2004)
Summary:
Where a finding is ambiguous and could be read to misinterpret a code provision, but read in context it is reasonably clear that the local government did not intend the erroneous interpretation petitioner ascribes to it, and in fact intended an interpretation consistent with the code provision, petitioner’s arguments based on that ambiguous finding do not provide a basis for reversal or remand.
Spiering v. Yamhill County, 25 Or LUBA 695 (1993)
Summary:
Local decision makers in quasi-judicial land use proceedings are not required to maintain the “appearance of impartiality” required of judges, but rather to have “actual impartiality,” the ability to make a decision based on the argument and evidence before them, rather than on prejudgment or personal interest.
Spiering v. Yamhill County, 25 Or LUBA 695 (1993)
Summary:
To establish actual bias or prejudgment on the part of a local decision maker, the petitioner has the burden of showing the decision maker was biased or prejudged the application and did not reach a decision by applying relevant standards based on the evidence and argument presented.
Horizon Construction, Inc. v. City of Newberg, 25 Or LUBA 656 (1993)
Summary:
If the contents of an ex parte communication are not publicly announced and placed in the record, as required by ORS 227.180(3), a city official’s request for responses to the ex parte communication does not provide the opportunity for rebuttal required by ORS 227.180(3)(b).
Derry v. Douglas County, 25 Or LUBA 790 (1993)
Summary:
A general objection to the record requesting that speakers in a transcript be identified, because it would be easier to prepare the petition for review, does not provide a sufficient basis to sustain the objection. A request that a particular speaker in a transcript in the record be identified, because that speaker was a decision maker below and his dialogue establishes the existence of impermissible ex parte contacts, provides a sufficient basis to sustain that aspect of the record objection.
Warning: No LUBA opinion: Matching opinion not found., Opinions for 'Derry v. Douglas County' exist but reporters mismatched: Unpublished (1995); 28 Or LUBA 212 (1994); 26 Or LUBA 25 (1993)
McInnis v. City of Portland, 25 Or LUBA 376 (1993)
Summary:
Where a local government’s staff briefs an absentee decision maker concerning matters in the record and does not impermissibly advocate denial of the application, but rather simply provides administrative support to the decision maker, the fact that petitioners had no opportunity to rebut the substance of that staff briefing provides no basis for reversal or remand of the challenged decision.
Caine v. Tillamook County, 25 Or LUBA 209 (1993)
Summary:
A party’s submission of proposed findings to a local decision maker does not constitute an ex parte contact warranting reversal or remand. In the absence of a local code provision to the contrary, there is no error in a local government’s utilization of such a process.
Heceta Water District v. Lane County, 24 Or LUBA 402 (1993)
Summary:
Where a settlement agreement in a lawsuit previously filed by intervenor against a county simply says the county will consider a rezoning application for intervenor’s property, as it is required to do under ORS 215.416(2) in any case, the settlement agreement is irrelevant to an application for a replacement dwelling on the subject property, and does not establish bias or prejudgment by the county decision maker.
Linebarger v. City of The Dalles, 24 Or LUBA 91 (1992)
Summary:
A local government decision maker is entitled to consult with its attorney regarding evidence submitted during the evidentiary phase of the local proceeding and interpretive issues. Parties have no right to rebut the substance of a local government attorney’s advice to the local government decision maker.
Heiller v. Josephine County, 23 Or LUBA 551 (1992)
Summary:
In establishing actual bias or prejudgment on the part of a local decision maker, the burden is on petitioner to show the decision maker was biased or prejudged the application and did not reach its decision by applying applicable standards based on the evidence and argument presented.
Rath v. Hood River County, 23 Or LUBA 200 (1992)
Summary:
To establish actual bias or prejudgment on the part of a local government decision maker, the burden is on petitioners to establish that the decision maker was biased or prejudged the application and did not reach its decision by applying applicable standards based on the evidence and argument presented.
McAlister v. Jackson County, 47 Or LUBA 125 (2004)
Summary:
A hearings officer errs in determining that an internal logging road is not a “road” because of its poor condition and infrequent use, where the code definition of “road” does not assign significance to the road’s condition or frequency of use.
Horizon Construction, Inc. v. City of Newberg, 23 Or LUBA 159 (1992)
Summary:
Delay in disclosing an ex parte contact until after the close of the public hearing, and failure to make an announcement of the right to rebut the substance of the ex parte communication, as required by ORS 227.180(3)(b), are at most procedural errors.
Southwood Homeowners Assoc. v. City of Philomath, 22 Or LUBA 742 (1992)
Summary:
Where a new city councilor discloses his prior participation in a quasi-judicial land use proceeding and declares that he can render an unbiased decision on the matter following a remand from LUBA, that the city councilor is a realtor who might benefit through sale of lots in the subdivision in the future is too speculative to support a determination that his decision is influenced by bias or self interest.
Marson v. Clackamas County, 22 Or LUBA 497 (1991)
Summary:
Where the planning department is not the decision maker, contacts between the planning department and neighbors of the applicant need not be disclosed by the decision maker under ORS 215.422(3).
Marson v. Clackamas County, 22 Or LUBA 497 (1991)
Summary:
Although under ORS 215.422(3) it may be error for a hearings officer to fail to disclose prior contacts with the planning department, it is a procedural error. LUBA may not reverse or remand on the basis of procedural error unless such error prejudices petitioner’s substantial rights. Petitioner’s substantial rights are not prejudiced by such error where petitioner was aware of and had an opportunity to respond to the substance of the contacts with the planning department.
Toth v. Curry County, 22 Or LUBA 488 (1991)
Summary:
A board of county commissioners need not provide parties an opportunity to rebut a memorandum in which the county counsel provides legal advice concerning a pending local land use appeal. Such communications are not ex parte contacts. ORS 215.422(4).
Toth v. Curry County, 22 Or LUBA 488 (1991)
Summary:
A petitioner may not assert the occurrence of his own ex parte contacts with the decision maker as a basis for reversal or remand, where the contacts were disclosed and petitioner did not object to the adequacy or completeness of the disclosure of such ex parte contacts.
Oregon Worsted Company v. City of Portland, 22 Or LUBA 452 (1991)
Summary:
LUBA will not presume a local government decision maker is partial simply because the local government is the applicant for land use approval.
Oregon Worsted Company v. City of Portland, 22 Or LUBA 452 (1991)
Summary:
In establishing actual bias or prejudgment on the part of a local government decision maker, the burden is on petitioner to show the decision maker was biased or prejudged the application and did not reach its decision by applying applicable standards based on the evidence and argument presented.
Oregon Worsted Company v. City of Portland, 22 Or LUBA 452 (1991)
Summary:
That the initial administrative decision maker was not impartial would be insufficient grounds to reverse or remand a challenged decision, where petitioner was afforded a de novo review of the administrative decision, including a public hearing, by a hearings officer.
Cummins v. Washington County, 22 Or LUBA 129 (1991)
Summary:
To establish a claim of bias sufficient to result in reversal or remand of a challenged decision, a petitioner is required to clearly demonstrate that the public officials charged with bias are incapable of making a decision on the basis of the evidence and argument presented.
McAlister v. Jackson County, 47 Or LUBA 125 (2004)
Summary:
Where a hearings officer misinterprets the code term “road,” but does not address either the applicant’s proposed interpretation that a logging track can be a “road” or a contrary planning staff interpretation that only platted rights-of-way or legally described easements are “roads,” LUBA will remand the decision to the hearings officer to reconsider what constitutes a “road.”
Schmaltz v. City of Hood River, 22 Or LUBA 115 (1991)
Summary:
Personal bias sufficiently strong to disqualify a public official must be clearly demonstrated. A petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that the public official was incapable of making a decision based on the evidence and argument before him.
Holladay Investors, Ltd. v. City of Portland, 22 Or LUBA 90 (1991)
Summary:
Contacts between city decision makers and planning staff are by definition not ex parte contacts. ORS 227.180(3) and (4).
Warning: Name mismatch: 'holladay investors ltd v portland' vs 'to 061 holladay investors ltd v portland'
Holladay Investors, Ltd. v. City of Portland, 22 Or LUBA 90 (1991)
Summary:
While the requirement that local governments carrying out public land development projects grant land use approvals to themselves presents inherent appearance of bias problems, such appearance problems, in and of themselves, present no basis for reversal or remand.
Warning: Name mismatch: 'holladay investors ltd v portland' vs 'to 061 holladay investors ltd v portland'
Brown & Cole, Inc. v. City of Estacada, 21 Or LUBA 392 (1991)
Summary:
A city attorney’s statement at the beginning of the city council hearing, to the effect that parties are welcome to rebut ex parte communications, satisfies the requirement of ORS 227.180(3)(b) that a public announcement of the parties’ right to rebut the substance of an ex parte communication be made at the first hearing following the communication.
Waker Associates, Inc. v. Clackamas County, 21 Or LUBA 588 (1991)
Summary:
That a decision maker may have interpreted the local plan and code incorrectly in some respects does not establish that the decision maker was biased or had undisclosed ex parte contacts.
Warning: Only opinion found with matching name has mismatched reporter: WAKER ASSOCIATES, INC. v. CLACKAMAS COUNTY, 22 Or LUBA 233 (1991)
Carsey v. Deschutes County, 21 Or LUBA 118 (1991)
Summary:
Read in context, a hearings officer’s findings and conclusions describing a commercial development as “garish” do not demonstrate bias or prejudgment.
Kittleson v. Lane County, 20 Or LUBA 286 (1990)
Summary:
In order to establish bias on the part of the decision maker, petitioner must show that the decision maker either has a personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding or has prejudged the matter. LUBA will not infer the existence of bias on the part of a decision maker.
Knapp v. City of Jacksonville, 20 Or LUBA 189 (1990)
Summary:
Where the city council conducted a de novo review of the planning commission’s decision, only the city council members are the decision makers, and actions by the city planner and planning commission members do not demonstrate bias on the part of the city decision makers.
Knapp v. City of Jacksonville, 20 Or LUBA 189 (1990)
Summary:
Allegations that the city council misinterpreted plan and code provisions and overlooked items in the record, even if true, would simply demonstrate error in the decision made by the city council, not that the council members had prejudged the matter and were incapable of making an objective decision on petitioners’ subdivision application based on the evidence and argument before them.
Hoffman v. City of Lake Oswego, 20 Or LUBA 64 (1990)
Summary:
It is not error for a governing body to provide a lower local tribunal with a memorandum in the nature of a declaratory ruling interpreting certain code provisions while an application to which those code provisions apply is pending before the lower tribunal. Even if it were a procedural error, there would be no prejudice if petitioners had an adequate opportunity in a local appeal to address the interpretation and applicability of the code provisions in question before the governing body.
Doob v. City of Grants Pass, 47 Or LUBA 152 (2004)
Summary:
A local government may not interpret a local code provision that requires connection to “an existing city standard paved street” to be satisfied by a security deposit in lieu of an improved street.
Burk v. Umatilla County, 20 Or LUBA 54 (1990)
Summary:
Even if the planning commission chairman’s participation in the planning commission proceedings on a proposed comprehensive plan amendment were improper, de novo review of the proposed plan amendment by the city council cured any such impropriety.
McNulty v. Marion County, 19 Or LUBA 367 (1990)
Summary:
That a member of the county counsel’s office acts as hearings officer does not, itself, deny the petitioner an unbiased decision maker, nor does it necessarily imply that improper ex parte contacts occurred between the hearings officer and the board of commissioners.
Murphey v. City of Ashland, 19 Or LUBA 182 (1990)
Summary:
The planning commission’s error in failing to consider the propriety of a commissioner’s participation in the decision on the subject application, where the issue was raised before the commission, is procedural and, therefore, petitioner must establish the error caused prejudice to his substantial rights.
Murphey v. City of Ashland, 19 Or LUBA 182 (1990)
Summary:
If the governing body holds a de novo hearing on an appeal of the planning commission’s decision on the subject application, such hearing cures any prejudice due to a planning commissioner’s allegedly improper participation in the planning commission proceedings.
Walker v. City of Beaverton, 18 Or LUBA 712 (1990)
Summary:
Where a mayor’s ex parte contacts were completely disclosed, although late in the deliberations and after an incomplete disclosure earlier in the proceedings, and the mayor invited challenges and inquiries, the remedial purpose of ORS 227.180(3) is nevertheless served. Where petitioners did not object to the timing and manner of the disclosure, and do not show their substantial rights were violated, there is no basis for remand.
Walker v. City of Beaverton, 18 Or LUBA 712 (1990)
Summary:
A mayor’s disclosure of ex parte contacts with former associates and political supporters at most creates an appearance of impropriety and does not show actual bias.
Douglas v. Multnomah County, 18 Or LUBA 607 (1990)
Summary:
Where the record shows the ex parte contacts alleged by petitioner were disclosed during local hearings, such ex parte contacts provide no basis for reversal or remand.
Beck v. City of Tillamook, 18 Or LUBA 587 (1990)
Summary:
Standing alone, the fact that a city council approved a federal block grant for a homeless shelter does not disqualify the city council on the basis of bias from considering a subsequent land use application for the homeless shelter.
Landwatch Lane County v. Lane County, 79 Or LUBA 96 (2019)
Summary:
Where state statute requires that a local government provide either a public hearing before ruling on an application for a statutory permit or an opportunity for an appeal that includes a de novo public hearing, although the local government may require a notice of appeal that sets forth with reasonable particularity the issues that the appealing party will raise at the hearing, the local government may not, consistent with the statute, (1) make that notice requirement a jurisdictional bar to obtaining the hearing, (2) limit the issues specified to five types of issues, or (3) approve or reject requests for hearings based on a qualitative assessment of how well the appellant has explained the issues specified.
Niederer v. City of Albany, 79 Or LUBA 305 (2019)
Summary:
A city councilor’s statement in the comment section of an online blog article that a specific application should be approved in order to “get[] this particular monkey off of [the applicant’s] back” is sufficient to demonstrate both actual bias and that the councilor has so prejudged the matter as to be incapable of determining its merits based on the evidence and arguments presented, and any subsequent decision on the application in which the biased councilor participates will be remanded, to allow the council to consider the application without the biased councilor’s participation. A statement made by the biased councilor during a public hearing on the application that he will render an impartial decision does not cure his demonstrated actual bias.
Doob v. City of Grants Pass, 47 Or LUBA 152 (2004)
Summary:
A local government has the discretion to interpret a local code provision requiring private streets to provide for pedestrian needs in a “safe and functional manner” to not require sidewalks on private streets serving four or fewer units, in context with another code provision that requires sidewalks on private streets only if the streets serve more than four units.
Hood River Valley Residents Comm. v. Hood River County, 78 Or LUBA 282 (2018)
Summary:
When a county opts to approve a permit without a public hearing, any person who is adversely affected or aggrieved, or who is entitled to notice of the decision may appeal a decision made without a hearing. The county cannot require participation prior to a decision, either by attending a conference (that may or may not have occurred), or providing written comments, or in any other manner. Additionally, the county may not enact additional restrictions to prevent a person who is entitled to file an appeal under the ORS 215.416(11)(a)(A) right to file a local appeal.
Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition v. Coos County, 76 Or LUBA 346 (2017)
Summary:
Deferral of compliance with an approval standard to a subsequent proceeding under Rhyne v. Multnomah County, 23 Or LUBA 442 (1992), or Gould v. Deschutes County, 227 Or App 601, 206 P3d 1106 (2009), may not be permissible at all where the approval standard at issue invokes a particular process that is explicitly linked to submittal of the development application, requiring consultation and dispute resolution between the applicant, the local government, and a sovereign Native American Tribe before development approval.
Oregon Shores Conservation Coalition v. Coos County, 76 Or LUBA 346 (2017)
Summary:
A local government errs in imposing a condition of approval deferring consideration of compliance with a comprehensive plan policy requiring the applicant and county to undertake a process to consult and resolve differences with local Native American tribes before approving development in an estuary, where the deferral is to an ad hoc proceeding without any assurances that the deferred proceeding will actually occur, and the deferral is not supported by findings demonstrating that deferral is permissible under Rhyne v. Multnomah County, 23 Or LUBA 442 (1992), or Gould v. Deschutes County, 227 Or App 601, 206 P3d 1106 (2009).
Central Eastside Industrial Council v. City of Portland, 74 Or LUBA 221 (2016)
Summary:
Where no statute or local code provision requires that a city council, in making the city’s final decision on a request for a zoning classification as described in ORS 227.160(2)(b), conduct the city council meeting pursuant to quasi-judicial land use procedures requiring notice and an evidentiary hearing, the city council does not err in conducting the meeting pursuant only to the procedures governing a public meeting.
Rosenzweig v. City of McMinnville, 64 Or LUBA 402 (2011)
Summary:
If a local government in granting planned development approval wishes to defer a finding that is required at the time of planned development approval to a subsequent, future proceeding, it must ensure that the public will be provided the same participatory rights at the future proceeding that they have at the time of planned development approval.
Rosenzweig v. City of McMinnville, 64 Or LUBA 402 (2011)
Summary:
A tentative subdivision approval decision that imposes a condition of approval that the applicant must submit a revised tentative subdivision plat to reflect an amendment to the application that was submitted before the local government adopted its decision is not accurately characterized as an improper requirement for a replat without public participation.
Boucot v. City of Corvallis, 61 Or LUBA 459 (2010)
Summary:
When approving a subdivision where approval criteria must be applied in a proceeding where the public has participatory rights, a city may defer findings on a required approval criterion to a later proceeding, so long as that later proceeding is one in which the public has participatory rights.
Mazorol v. City of Bend, 59 Or LUBA 260 (2009)
Summary:
The obligation to conduct a “hearing at least for argument” under ORS 227.180(1)(a)(B) only applies when a city council conducts a review of a lower body’s decision. The obligation does not apply when the city council declines review thereby making the lower body’s decision the city’s final determination.
Kane v. City of Beaverton, 56 Or LUBA 240 (2008)
Summary:
Code procedures that distinguish between “Type II” permit decisions that can be made without an initial hearing, with an opportunity for affected persons to appeal to a de novo hearing, and “Type III” permit decisions that require an initial hearing, do not violate the privileges and immunities clause by granting “privileges” to participants of Type III proceedings that are denied Type II participants.
Neighbors 4 Responsible Growth v. City of Veneta, 52 Or LUBA 325 (2006)
Summary:
Although a local government is obligated to open the evidentiary record to allow the parties to address any new criteria that may be applied on remand from LUBA, where a local government applies the same criterion on remand that it did in its initial decision and merely cites different comprehensive plan policies to explain how it interprets that criterion, the local government is not obligated to reopen the evidentiary record.
Gumtow- Farrior v. Crook County, 47 Or LUBA 186 (2004)
Summary:
Where a conditional use approval criterion requires a finding that the proposed conditional use will have minimal adverse impacts “compared to the impact of development that is permitted outright,” a county decision that interprets that criterion to be met by a proposed commercial recreational park, because an otherwise identical publicly owned recreational park could be approved as a use permitted outright, is not reversible under ORS 197.829(1).
Moreland v. City of Depoe Bay, 48 Or LUBA 136 (2004)
Summary:
A local government errs in deferring a determination of compliance with a discretionary permit criterion requiring that development protect riparian vegetation and aesthetic resources to a subsequent staff review that does not provide for notice or hearing.
Jaqua v. City of Springfield, 46 Or LUBA 566 (2004)
Summary:
That comprehensive plan policies apply to a challenged grading permit, and thus the permit is a “land use decision” as defined by ORS 197.015(10), does not necessarily mean that the city is obligated to provide a hearing on the grading permit. Not all permits that are land use decisions are also statutory “permits” as defined by ORS 215.402 and 227.160 and subject to statutory requirements to provide a hearing or opportunity for a hearing.
Manning v. Marion County, 45 Or LUBA 1 (2003)
Summary:
A local government does not err in failing to provide an evidentiary hearing on remand to accept updated information regarding the current status of petitioner’s property, where LUBA’s remand did not require the local government to conduct additional evidentiary hearings, and petitioner fails to identify any authority that requires the local government to conduct an additional evidentiary hearing to accept updated information.
Martin v. City of Dunes City, 45 Or LUBA 458 (2003)
Summary:
A city denial of petitioners’ request for an evidentiary hearing after remand from LUBA is not error, where (1) petitioners had an opportunity to present evidence and argument during the city’s initial proceedings; (2) the city did not apply new approval criteria or consider new evidence in making its decision on remand; and (3) petitioners do not provide a reason why the initial evidentiary proceedings were inadequate to address petitioners’ application.
Baker v. Lane County, 43 Or LUBA 493 (2003)
Summary:
Where a hearings officer finds that it is feasible to comply with an approval standard, and imposes conditions to ensure compliance, the issue becomes whether that finding is adequate and supported by substantial evidence, not whether the hearings officer improperly deferred a finding of compliance to a later review stage. The fact that the hearings officer addresses the possibility that the solution found to be feasible might not work, and finds that if so DEQ would require that the project be scaled back, does not mean that the hearings officer deferred a finding of compliance with the approval standard or impermissibly delegated that finding to DEQ.
Arlington Heights Homeowners v. City of Portland, 41 Or LUBA 185 (2001)
Summary:
A local government’s decision to request that an applicant prepare revised findings to respond to a LUBA remand does not, by itself, obligate the local government to provide a hearing following LUBA’s remand.
Warning: Name mismatch: 'arlington heights homeowners v portland' vs 'arlington heights v portland'
Arlington Heights Homeowners v. City of Portland, 41 Or LUBA 185 (2001)
Summary:
Parties that seek to demonstrate that a local government erred by adopting an interpretation of local land use legislation after the opportunity for argument and evidentiary presentations closes must demonstrate (1) that the interpretation was unforeseeable, and (2) that the party can produce new evidence that is different from evidence in the record and is directly responsive to the unanticipated interpretation. Gutoski v. Lane County, 155 Or App 369, 963 P2d 145 (1998).
Warning: Name mismatch: 'arlington heights homeowners v portland' vs 'arlington heights v portland'
Arlington Heights Homeowners v. City of Portland, 41 Or LUBA 185 (2001)
Summary:
Where LUBA remands a land use decision for inadequate findings, parties have no unqualified right to demand a hearing to present additional argument or evidence under Morrison v. City of Portland, 70 Or App 437, 689 P2d 1027 (1984).
Warning: Name mismatch: 'arlington heights homeowners v portland' vs 'arlington heights v portland'
Neighbors for Livability v. City of Beaverton, 40 Or LUBA 52 (2001)
Summary:
A city rezoning decision conditioned on the applicant providing a geotechnical report and allowing the city to retain an independent engineer to ensure adequate monitoring and mitigation of environmental hazards during construction as part of the site development permit process, which does not provide for public hearings, does not defer discretionary decision making to a later stage of review. In that circumstance, the conditions are properly viewed as being designed to support the city’s threshold finding that environmental hazards on the subject property do not impact adjoining properties in violation of comprehensive plan objectives.
Neighbors for Sensible Dev. v. City of Sweet Home, 40 Or LUBA 21 (2001)
Summary:
A nonbinding preliminary PUD approval is equivalent to a tentative decision following a pre-application conference or review, and therefore does not trigger the statutory requirement under ORS 227.175(3) for a public hearing or the right of local appeal to challenge a permit decision rendered without a prior public hearing.
Nelson v. Curry County, 47 Or LUBA 196 (2004)
Summary:
Findings that rely on code drainage requirements to avoid impacts on adjacent farming are adequate to demonstrate compliance with a code standard requiring no significant impact on farming, where the only issue raised regarding impacts on adjacent farming involved drainage.
Mitchell v. Washington County, 37 Or LUBA 452 (2000)
Summary:
A finding of feasibility of compliance with a code standard requiring adequate fire protection, conditioned on the fire marshal’s written approval of a proposed emergency turnaround, does not impermissibly defer a finding of compliance with that standard to a second stage of review that fails to provide notice and opportunity for hearing, where the finding of feasibility of compliance is based on evidence that the proposed emergency turnaround is acceptable to the fire marshal.
Tenly Properties Corp. v. Washington County, 34 Or LUBA 352 (1998)
Summary:
A local code provision requiring an “adequate turnaround” is not satisfied by deferring the decision concerning the design of the turnaround to the fire district where (1) there will be no opportunity for public comment or a hearing, and (2) designs required by the fire district will require adjustments to or elimination of one or more lots.
Warning: Name mismatch: 'tenly properties v washington' vs 'tenley properties v washington'
Tenly Properties Corp. v. Washington County, 34 Or LUBA 352 (1998)
Summary:
In order for a county to find it is feasible to comply with a code requirement for an “adequate turnaround,” it must have a proposed turnaround to review. The county may not defer development and approval of a proposed turnaround to a later stage where there is no opportunity for public hearing.
Warning: Name mismatch: 'tenly properties v washington' vs 'tenley properties v washington'
Property Rights and Owners, Ltd. v. City of Salem, 34 Or LUBA 258 (1998)
Summary:
A local government has not deferred compliance with mandatory approval criteria where it grants tentative subdivision approval with the condition that development plans be reviewed by a geotechnical engineer prior to the issuance of construction permits. Once a local government has determined that compliance with a mandatory criterion is feasible, it may impose conditions of approval to ensure compliance with that criterion. No hearing on the geotechnical report is required.
Johnston v. City of Albany, 34 Or LUBA 32 (1998)
Summary:
Where a local code requires that manufactured home parks “which contain land within the floodplain district” be subject to a “Type III” review, Type III review is required to approve a proposed manufactured home park, notwithstanding that no “development” is proposed for the portion of the park located in the floodplain district.
R/C Pilots Association v. Marion County, 33 Or LUBA 532 (1997)
Summary:
A county does not commit a procedural error where local ordinances allow the county to call up a hearings officer decision and refer it back for reconsideration without first providing an opportunity for a hearing. A party is not prejudiced by such a summary procedure where it is provided an opportunity to appeal the hearings officer’s decision on reconsideration.
Johns v. City of Lincoln City, 32 Or LUBA 195 (1996)
Summary:
ORS 197.175(10)(a) requires the city to provide, on appeal from a decision made without a hearing, at least one hearing at which any issue may be raised.
Richards-Kreitzberg v. Marion County, 32 Or LUBA 76 (1996)
Summary:
Where, on remand from LUBA, the county corrects an error in its decision, it is not required to follow the procedures that were required during the initial proceeding.
Azevedo v. City of Albany, 29 Or LUBA 516 (1995)
Summary:
When the city zoning ordinance makes final approval of a tentative subdivision plan a limited land use decision appealable to LUBA, a decision applying the ordinance is not a “tentative decision” that can be appealed locally at a hearing pursuant to ORS 227.175(10).
Warning: Only opinion found with matching name has mismatched reporter: Azevedo v. City of Albany, 57 Or LUBA 456 (2008)
Save Amazon Coalition v. City of Eugene, 29 Or LUBA 335 (1995)
Summary:
ORS 197.763 governs how a quasi-judicial land use hearing is conducted, not whether one is required. ORS 197.763 does not confer a right to a quasi-judicial land use hearing where such a right does not otherwise exist.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hood River County, 47 Or LUBA 256 (2004)
Summary:
A governing body’s interpretation of a design review criterion requiring that the “bulk and scale” of a proposed retail supercenter be “compatible” with surrounding buildings as necessitating a comparison of the size of the proposed buildings and surrounding buildings—and not just visual compatibility—is consistent with the text of the criterion and not reversible under ORS 197.829(1)(a).
Save Amazon Coalition v. City of Eugene, 29 Or LUBA 335 (1995)
Summary:
Fasano v. Washington Co. Comm., 264 Or 574, 507 P2d 23 (1973), does not independently confer a right to a hearing prior to a local government determination on compliance with particular code requirements, where none is conferred by the statutes or local regulations governing such land use decisions.
Save Amazon Coalition v. City of Eugene, 29 Or LUBA 335 (1995)
Summary:
Where LUBA remands a decision because the local decision maker failed to adopt findings explaining its determination of compliance with relevant approval standards, and the local decision maker was not required to hold a hearing before making its initial decision, the local decision maker is not required to hold a hearing on remand.
Friends of the Metolius v. Jefferson County, 28 Or LUBA 591 (1995)
Summary:
Where LUBA remands a local government decision because it lacks findings of compliance with relevant approval standards, the local government must, at a minimum, conduct a hearing on remand to allow the parties an opportunity to present argument based on the possible interpretations to be adopted by the local government on remand.
Collins v. Klamath County, 28 Or LUBA 553 (1995)
Summary:
Where a local government is required to adopt a new decision on remand, it must conduct a hearing and provide notice of that hearing, at least for the purpose of allowing argument on the proposal’s compliance with the standards to be addressed on remand.
Fechtig v. City of Albany, 27 Or LUBA 666 (1994)
Summary:
If a “permit” decision is erroneously is processed as a limited land use decision, without a public hearing or an opportunity to request a hearing through a local appeal, then the challenged decision is a “land use decision” made without providing a hearing, and the deadline for filing a notice of intent to appeal with LUBA is governed by ORS 197.830(3).
Warning: No LUBA opinion: Matching opinion not found., Opinions for 'Fechtig v. City of Albany' exist but reporters mismatched: 31 Or LUBA 410 (1996); 31 Or LUBA 441 (1996); 27 Or LUBA 480 (1994); 24 Or LUBA 577 (1993)
DLCD v. Benton County, 27 Or LUBA 49 (1994)
Summary:
Decisions concerning development of property applying the elements of equitable estoppel require the exercise of factual and legal judgment and, therefore, are permits. Where a local government fails to provide a local public hearing or opportunity for appeal of such a permit decision, the deadline for filing a notice of intent to appeal the decision to LUBA is governed by ORS 197.830(3).
Van Veldhuizen v. Marion County, 26 Or LUBA 468 (1994)
Summary:
Where a permit applicant receives a public hearing and decision from a local government and, under the local code, an appeal to the governing body may be decided without further public hearing, the governing body commits no error by denying the applicant’s appeal at a public meeting without further notice or public hearing.
Van Veldhuizen v. Marion County, 26 Or LUBA 468 (1994)
Summary:
Where the local code provides a possibility of, but not a right to, a second public hearing on appeal of a hearings officer’s decision, the appeal may be denied without providing an additional public hearing, and the code need not include standards for determining whether to grant an additional public hearing.
Tuality Lands Coalition v. Washington County, 22 Or LUBA 319 (1991)
Summary:
Where adoption of the challenged decision required the exercise of factual and legal judgment, the decision required the exercise of discretion and, consequently, approves a “permit.” Under these circumstances, it is error for the local government to fail to provide petitioner with notice and opportunity for hearing, where at least some of petitioner’s members were entitled to notice if a public hearing had been scheduled.
Warning: Name mismatch: 'tuality lands coalition v washington' vs '036 tuality lands coalition v washington'
Von Lubken v. Hood River County, 20 Or LUBA 208 (1990)
Summary:
Where the local code establishes procedures and notice requirements for hearings on administrative actions, but does not require that determinations of compliance with conditions imposed on administrative action approvals themselves be processed as administrative actions, proceedings to determine compliance with such conditions are not required to follow the hearing and notice procedures for administrative actions.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hood River County, 47 Or LUBA 256 (2004)
Summary:
There is no intrinsic reason why a regulatory concern to ensure compatibility of size between proposed and existing development must be expressed as zoning standards rather than as site design review standards.
Von Lubken v. Hood River County, 20 Or LUBA 208 (1990)
Summary:
Where LUBA determined in a previous appeal that a local government properly found compliance with applicable code standards and, through conditions, deferred responsibility for developing particular technical solutions to the planning commission, and LUBA’s decision was not appealed, the local government is entitled to determine compliance with the conditions of approval administratively, without notice and public hearing.
Nicolai v. City of Portland, 19 Or LUBA 142 (1990)
Summary:
Where an amended code provides discretionary criteria for approval of minor land divisions, it is error for the code to fail to require or provide for notice and hearing before the local government makes a final decision concerning a proposed minor land division.
VanDyke v. Yamhill County, 78 Or LUBA 530 (2018)
Summary:
A proposed land use that requires a conditional land use permit must be processed under quasi-judicial, rather than legislative, procedures where the applicable county code provision specifies that conditional uses in the exclusive farm use zone are subject to conditional use criteria and “shall be reviewed” according to the county’s quasi-judicial review procedures. Further, according to Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Board of Comm., 287 Or 591, 602-03, 601 P2d 769 (1979), the Oregon Supreme Court established a three-factor test to determine whether a land use matter is quasi-judicial or legislative, and where all three factors indicate that the county’s action is quasi-judicial in nature, the county also erred in processing the application under its legislative rather than its quasi-judicial procedures.
Warning: Name mismatch: 'vandyke v yamhill' vs 'van dyke v yamhill'
Setniker v. Polk County, 75 Or LUBA 1 (2017)
Summary:
Where a county code provision governing the conduct of proceedings on remand is not limited by text or context to remands of quasi-judicial decisions, a county does not err in applying those provisions to govern the conduct of proceedings on remand of a legislative decision.
Forest Park Neighborhood Assoc. v. Washington County, 73 Or LUBA 193 (2016)
Summary:
An ordinance that amends the width and features of a buffer area between urban and rural lands is properly viewed as a legislative rather than quasi-judicial decision, where the ordinance was adopted as part of a legislative process that was not bound to result in a decision, the modified buffer affects over 135 acres of land that stretch over one mile in length, and the amendments potentially affect hundreds of property owners.
Housing Land Advocates v. City of Happy Valley, 73 Or LUBA 405 (2016)
Summary:
That a comprehensive plan map amendment may be quasi-judicial, and therefore potentially approvable by a planning commission, does not mean relevant statutes may not require that action be taken by the governing body before the map amendment can become final and effective.
Squier v. Multnomah County, 71 Or LUBA 98 (2015)
Summary:
A hearings officer’s decision on a property owner’s request for an interpretation as to whether approving a floating home development in a zone that allows such development requires an exception to Goal 14 is a quasi-judicial decision rather than a legislative decision. Consequently, the “raise it or waive it” provisions of ORS 197.763(1) apply.